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 Rethinking the history of Habsburg Central Europe
By Pieter Judson
 Since the Balk an Wars of a cen-tury ago, historians, journalists, and policy makers in Europe and the US 
have repeatedly interpreted nationalist 
political claims and nationalist conflicts in 
terms largely devised by nationalists them-
selves. In allowing nationalists to shape our 
understanding of both historical and con-
temporary conflicts, we unwittingly follow 
a logic that – taken to extremes – demands 
both physical separation and independent 
statehood for ethnically defined national 
populations. This logic rests on claims that 
social life is normally organized by com-
munities of descent, defined according to 
factors as diverse as race, culture, religion, 
language, or some vaguely defined ethnic-
ity. If we wish to prevent violence from 
breaking out among neighboring peoples, 
this logic demands that political power be 
organized on the basis of separation. 
Within Europe, the classic locus for the 
problem of conflict among nations has 
traditionally been understood to be Central 
and Eastern Europe. And indeed one could 
argue that in the twentieth century, much 
blood appeared to be shed for nationalist 
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reasons especially, if not exclusively, in the 
Balkans and Eastern Europe. Many observ-
ers argued that this was due to a mosaic-like 
distribution of different linguistic usage or 
religious practice across the region, mak-
ing national communities incapable of easy 
territorial separation. Of course, the con-
cept of an East particularly troubled by eth-
nic conflict tends to forget the nationalist 
violence that continues to plague Western 
European societies as well. Still, for a hun-
dred years now, in Europe as a whole, policy 
makers’ focus on national difference as 
the basis of social conflict makes territorial 
separation – even population transfer – 
appear to be legitimate and even effective 
policies for containing nationalist conflict. 
I am a historian, and certainly not a 
policy maker. I see how the weight of histo-
ries that constantly reaffirm the reality and 
centrality of nationhood in East Central 
Europe repeatedly encourage policy makers 
to treat ethnic separation as a viable solu-
tion to ethnic conflict. By repeatedly telling 
the history of the region in terms that tacit-
ly endorse the views of nationalist activists, 
however we may deplore those activists, we 
privilege policies that tacitly legitimate the 
very separation of people that we allegedly 
deplore. More importantly, our reliance on 
nationalist narratives diminishes our abili-
ty to consider other possible interpretations 
of the character and dynamics of these 
conflicts. And it minimizes the experiences 
of those linguistically or religiously mixed 
regions that have not exploded in violent 
social conflict. With that in mind, I have 
embarked on a project to write a history 
of Habsburg Central Europe that does not 
organize the region’s history around a con-
cept of ethnic nationhood. Instead, I seek to 
make visible alternative elements of social 
organization in the Habsburg Monarchy 
that did not rely on ideas of national com-
munity for their coherence. 
Thanks largely to the national organi-
zation of European societies today, most 
historians of Habsburg Central Europe 
still begin their story with ethnic nations 
as the fundamental building blocks of the 
region’s history. Many write as if unified 
national subjects were the region’s pri-
mary actors throughout its history, using 
phrases we have all encountered, such as 
“the Czechs demanded autonomy,” or “the 
Hungarians sought independence.” The 
collapse of the Empire in 1918 represents 
the inevitable telos or goal toward which 
all of these separate national histories 
were moving. The people, institutions, and 
events in history that did not fit this (trium-
phalist and totalizing) explanation – along 
with the evidence they left for alternate 
understandings of their world – are ren-
dered invisible or marginal by this view. 
For a small example of an alternate way 
to understand the region’s history, let me 
return to one of the premier sites of the 
nationality conflict in Austria-Hungary: 
to Bohemia. Here, Czech and German 
nationalists had battled each other in city 
halls, in legislative chambers, and often in 
the streets, since 1848. Their organizations 
mobilized thousands of Bohemians for 
one side or another. This Czech-German 
national conflict became particularly notori-
ous in 1938–39 when, with the help of Adolf 
Hitler, it led to the complete destruction 
of Czechoslovakia. During the very last 
weeks of the Monarchy’s existence, in July 
1918, journalist Robert Scheu set out from 
Vienna to visit Southern Bohemia. His 
object, he later wrote, was to “experience 
the national question in Bohemia as a tour-
ist.” In particular, Scheu wanted to know 
“how the national struggle manifests itself 
in the life of the individual, what concrete 
contents stand behind the [nationalist] slo-
gans, and what effects the struggle has had 
[on society].” 1 By 1918, of course, much had 
already been written on almost every pos-
sible aspect of national conflict in Austria-
Hungary, especially in Bohemia. Scheu nev-
ertheless believed that as a German-speaker 
from Vienna, he did not adequately under-
stand the human dimension of the national-
ity struggle between Czechs and Germans 
in Bohemia. He hoped to discover how this 
conflict played itself out in the emotions and 
actions of everyday Bohemians, not simply 
political activists. What ended up distin-
guishing Scheu’s trip, however, was less 
what he concluded about national conflict 
in Bohemia, than the actual evidence he 
collected from rural interlocutors in ethni-
cally-mixed villages of Southern Bohemia. 
Several of these testimonies are particu-
larly striking in their speakers’ apparent 
refusal to recognize substantial distinctions 
between Czech and German Bohemians. 
Repeatedly, Scheu encountered respondents 
who either did not think they belonged to 
one of Bohemia’s two nations, or who saw 
no problem with belonging to both. 
Only recently have historians paid much 
attention to the kinds of indifference to 
national identification observed by Robert 
Scheu.2 For a long time, such attitudes 
had remained largely illegible to scholars, 
thanks to the normative nationalist lens 
through which most of us viewed the his-
tory of Central and Eastern Europe. For 
Scheu and his contemporaries, the discov-
ery of these attitudes posed no problem to 
their own belief that Bohemians belonged 
to distinctive, ethnically defined nations. 
They attributed them to ignorance born of 
rural backwardness. When they did com-
ment on these non-national people, it was 
as “pre-modern people” whose internal 
nationalist feelings had yet to be awakened. 
A modern education system, service in a 
national military, and greater involvement 
in the growing interregional economy 
would no doubt awaken national feelings 
in even the most isolated and ignorant 
individual. And indeed, the history of the 
next decades appeared to bear out this pre-
diction, as nationalist differences became 
even more strongly etched in local society 
in Bohemia and throughout East Central 
Europe.
If we examine more closely what Scheu’s 
respondents told him about their relation-
ship to nationality, however, two related 
problems become immediately apparent 
with historians’ approach to the history 
of national conflict in Habsburg Central 
Europe. The first problem is our too-ready 
conflation of language use with national 
self-identification. Should we necessarily 
categorize Czech speakers as Czech nation-
als or German speakers as German nation-
als? The second issue that Scheu’s evidence 
can help us to elucidate more critically is 
the presumption that national identifica-
tion or loyalty is somehow a fixed and ongo-
ing quality in people. 
Language Use = Nation?
 Since the early nineteenth century both nationalist activists and historians in East Central Europe 
generally defined national communities in 
terms of language use. 3 Older concepts of 
nationhood had rested on distinctions of 
class or privilege – the nobility represented 
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in the Hungarian diet, for example, had 
traditionally constituted the “Hungarian 
nation.” Differences in language use pro-
vided an easily recognizable form of differ-
ence that could be applied universally to 
larger populations. According to nationalist 
activists, the Habsburg dynasty ruled over 
several different slumbering nations. Not 
until a determined minority of “national 
awakeners” had come on the scene, aided 
by rising literacy rates and new mass media, 
did members of these various linguistic 
nations begin to awaken to their true iden-
tity. As they did, written and spoken lan-
guage use increasingly became understood 
as identity markers rather than as a neutral 
characteristic. 
The modernizing Habsburg state unwit-
tingly did its own part to help produce this 
concept of community or nationhood, by 
ensuring that educational, administra-
tive, and judicial practices took account of 
regional language use. Already in the 1750s 
the state saw the value in offering primary 
education in local vernacular languages. 
Quite separately from the rise of nationalist 
ideologies, language use in the Habsburg 
Monarchy gradually became linked to an 
emerging concept of citizenship. As the 
possibility of gaining primary education in 
the vernacular increasingly became viewed 
as a right of citizenship, more and more 
“language-activists” made broad political 
claims on the state regarding language 
use in other areas of administration. This 
creation of legal and administrative spaces, 
where the right to use different languages 
in public life was guaranteed, in turn 
helped to encourage a new concept of group 
identity based on shared language use. 
Thus this particular idea of nationhood 
based on language use was partially a prod-
uct of the unique laws and administrative 
practices of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
The definition of nationhood accord-
ing to language use was not as common-
sensical as one might today think. In the 
nineteenth century it often made for some 
strange bedfellows. After all, it implied that 
local German speakers from Bohemia in 
the West, for example, shared far more with 
German speakers hundreds of miles away 
in Eastern Bukovina than they did with 
their own neighbors who spoke Czech. The 
same logic claimed that Bohemian Czech 
speakers had more in common with far-
off Slovaks in Hungary than they did with 
their German-speaking neighbors . 4 The 
challenge to nationalist activism through-
out the nineteenth century was to persuade 
people to imagine their place in a larger 
national community whose boundaries 
transcended those of their rural villages or 
towns. People were willing to see language 
use as an issue of fairness in their town. 
They were less willing to imagine that this 
local question might have Empire-wide 
ramifications. 
Making use of a dizzying variety of 
strategies, hundreds and later thousands of 
activists sought to bring the abstract idea 
of nationhood to literate people at every 
level of society, and to make it real for them. 
In the nineteenth century it was often 
historians, not surprisingly, who were at 
the forefront of this work, reorganizing 
essentially regional histories into national-
ist narratives. Some, like Czech nationalist 
Frantisek Palacky, became important lead-
ers in their political movements. (Ironically, 
through their work, these men managed to 
place the concept of nation outside of his-
tory by arguing that it had always been pres-
ent since the very dawn of time.)
When they looked back to this earlier 
period of nationalization, historians in 
the twentieth century recognized the con-
structed nature of national communities 
and of nationalist claims. Many rejected 
the ahistoric claim that nations had always 
existed, awaiting their awakening in the 
modern world. But when it came to explain-
ing just how nations had been constructed 
in the nineteenth century, historians often 
fell back on time-honored nationalist tele-
ologies. When people “became national” in 
Bohemia, for example, it seemed a matter 
of common sense that those who spoke 
Czech had joined a Czech national com-
munity while those who spoke German had 
joined a German national community. 
Much evidence – some of which Scheu 
himself unwittingly collected – demon-
strates that factors other than language also 
determined which national community 
people joined . 5 In his game-changing 
study of the German linguistic minority 
in Prague, for example, Gary Cohen theo-
rized that it was the presence or absence of 
neighborhood social networks in a given 
language that had determined which 
national community people of the lowest 
social classes joined. Cohen used Prague 
census data to trace changes in neighbor-
hood language use over time, finding that 
where no social networks served German-
speaking working-class migrants to the city, 
they soon adopted the Czech language and 
joined a Czech-national social life. Cohen’s 
study posed a challenge to the normative 
presumption that prior language use had 
determined later national commitment. 
And if factors other than language use 
influenced people’s choice to join a national 
community, then the rise of popular nation-
alism in Habsburg Central Europe was far 
more a consequence of contingency, or of 
individual efforts, than a reflection of the 
prior existence of nations. In other words, 
the nationalist, as historians increasingly 
argue today, preceded the nation.
Following the nationalist lead, when 
historians thought about language use 
they rarely treated it as a functional choice, 
preferring to see in it an identity choice. In 
other words, where evidence might have 
suggested that Bohemians’ language use 
depended on social or economic opportu-
nity, historians read these choices more 
in nationalist terms. When Scheu and 
his contemporaries observed that some 
Bohemians were uncommitted to nation-
alism, or sought a bilingual education 
for their children, they interpreted this 
behavior as a rejection of modernity. Today, 
however, some historians argue that in 
fact the opposite was the case. Thanks to 
modernization – to new transport and com-
munications infrastructure, and to greater 
literacy – some Bohemians believed that 
bilingualism made good economic sense, 
especially in a time of significant regional 
labor migration. Their hesitation to commit 
themselves to a single national community 
may ultimately have been a product of 
economic and social modernization rather 
than a sign of backwardness or ignorance.
Nationalist Feeling:  
Fixed or Situational? 
 By the 1890s, the rise of national-ist radicalism in politics had spilled over from the legislatures and courts 
of Austria-Hungary into the streets and 
public squares. The extent of such theatri-
cal and public demonstrations led some 
contemporaries to fear for the very survival 
of the monarchy. How could a state encom-
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as a reflection of an ongoing popular com-
mitment to national communities. Several 
local incidents of violence reported in the 
nationalist press around 1900 in Bohemia 
turn out, upon closer inspection, to have 
been protests against the early closing of 
a pub or anger based on rumors of harm 
done to others. 
Following the recent lead of sociologist 
Rogers Brubaker, several scholars have 
begun investigating the particular his-
torical situations that produced bursts of 
popular nationalist commitment, rather 
than investigating the nation itself as a 
source for such outbursts. 7 According to 
this approach, the problem of violence 
is not due to the proximity of different 
national communities to each other, but 
rather to the ways in which people interpret 
their interests in specific situations. Some 
situations of nationalist conflict may be 
produced by people’s perception of a direct 
threat to their personal interests or safety. 
In other situations, however, nationalist 
feeling may be completely irrelevant to the 
very same people. Using such a situational 
approach helps to explain why Robert 
Scheu encountered examples of indiffer-
ence to nationhood in the summer of 1918 
among a population that at other times had 
demonstrated strong nationalist commit-
ments. The nation, according to this theory, 
is not a real or ongoing entity, but at best a 
situational community. 
From Choice to Ascription:  
The Real Change After 1918
 Only after the coll apse of the Habsburg Monarchy, and its replacement with several self-styled 
nation states, did the nationalist versions of 
history I have outlined here became truly 
normative. Their most compelling claim 
to legitimacy in the 1920s rested on their 
assertion to speak for the totality of the 
people. Politicians, historians, nationalist 
activists, and of course negotiators at the 
Paris peace settlements of 1919 all claimed 
that nationhood constituted a deep expres-
sion of popular democratic longings. An 
international system based on democratic 
principles of self-determination, they 
argued, demanded the creation of nation 
states. Even the defeated states (Germany, 
the new German-Austrian Republic, and 
the Kingdom of Hungary) argued for 
national self-determination in their efforts 
to revise the settlements. No one except for 
a handful of literary figures or purveyors of 
royalist nostalgia argued for a return to the 
a-national principles that had structured 
Imperial Austria. 
The presumption that nationalist policy 
somehow reflected the will of the people 
privileged the group over the individual in 
legal and administrative practice. Thus, in 
a flurry of restrictive decrees, several states 
ascribed ethnic nationality to their inhabit-
ants in ways that gave individuals no power 
to choose an ethnic or national identity for 
themselves. In Yugoslavia, for example, you 
could not claim minority status as a German 
unless your name was in fact German. In 
Czechoslovakia, you faced fines or a jail sen-
tence if you claimed minority status on the 
census and officials believed that you were 
objectively a member of the Czech nation. 
Those people who might have rejected 
national identity or adopted several – as had 
some of Scheu’s respondents in the summer 
of 1918 – were out of luck. Legally they could 
only belong to a single nation. 
Still others suffered greater injus-
tices. Many Austrian Jews from Galicia 
or Bukovina discovered after 1918 that no 
nation would accept their professions of 
membership, leaving them excluded alto-
gether from the benefits of national state 
citizenship or minority protection. National 
self-determination left no space for individ-
ual self-determination. As Hannah Arendt 
pointed out many years later, the rush to 
frame individual rights in national terms 
after 1918 meant that those who found 
themselves without a nation could assert 
no credible claim to human rights. 8
 
Conclusion
 Since the fall of communism, historians in many of the Habsburg successor states have not shaken 
off a vision of history based on narratives 
of distinctive nations throughout the 
centuries. If anything, their emergence 
from communism has produced an even 
more extreme nationalist historiography. 
These historians approach the Habsburg 
Empire emphasizing the separate histories 
and accomplishments of the particular 
nations they represent today, rather than 
the common political, administrative, and 
cultural institutions that together shaped 
passing so many quarreling nationalities 
continue to exist in this age of nationhood? 
It also led many later historians to consider 
the monarchy’s collapse as inevitable. Here 
again our tendency to normalize a national-
ist lens makes us equate specific political 
conflicts with popular feeling. Nationalist 
activists, we think, must have reflected the 
broadly based anger of their constituents. 
This view, however, renders some other 
important dynamics in the political culture 
of the monarchy invisible. 
The first of these was the increasingly 
active role taken by the dynasty to promote 
the concept of a multilingual society, in 
which diverse cultural groups developed 
their own identities and all shared loyalty 
to the emperor. 6 Nationalist political par-
ties may have fought each other vigorously 
in parliament, in the provincial legisla-
tures, or in town councils, but what is less 
well known is how they also competed 
publicly to profess their loyalty to the 
dynasty. Nationalist movements certainly 
demanded changes to the balance of politi-
cal power or even to the constitution, but 
they did not seek the state’s destruction. 
The retrospective assertion after 1918, that 
nationalists had somehow sought to bring 
down the state, completely misreads nation-
alism’s function and character in Austrian 
society. Yet another less-noticed dynamic 
of Habsburg political culture was the fre-
quent ability of nationalist enemies to join 
together in political compromise behind 
closed doors for the benefit of both parties. 
Not every situation was open to such com-
promise, but many were. 
And despite the powerful image of 
nationalist radicalism in the streets, we 
should nevertheless understand the per-
formative and situational nature of this 
activism. Demonstrations created national 
community by mobilizing a crowd of 
people. Demonstrations did not reflect the 
existence of a broad-based national com-
munity but rather a moment in which such 
community was briefly forged. When dem-
onstrations produced violent outcomes, the 
violence did not reflect the impossibility of 
coexistence among real national communi-
ties, but rather anger provoked by a particu-
lar situation. I am not even convinced that 
such violence should necessarily be read 
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instability to construct those communities 
persuasively in new and more radical ways 
for their political ends.
In the twenty-first century the impor-
tance of nationalist politics, their emotional 
attractiveness, and even many peoples’ 
commitment to them are undeniable. Yet 
should we still follow the lead of national-
ists by narrating the history of this region 
on their terms? In the context of Habsburg 
Central Europe it is clear that once nations 
become the subject of a history, it becomes 
impossible to evaluate the influence of 
shared institutions and common cultural 
practices on the peoples of the region, in 
their own terms. A large part of the history 
of Habsburg Central Europe thus remains 
invisible to us. My own attempts to tell 
this story may end with a Europe divided 
among nations and nation states, but it will 
certainly not start there. 
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the experiences of citizens of the Empire in 
the period 1770–1918. Historical examples 
of cross-language cooperation, whether 
in daily life or in politics, remain denied, 
unexplored, or consigned to a category of 
exceptionalism.
When historians, journalists, and policy 
makers in the US and Europe fail to interro-
gate nationalists’ easy claims to democratic 
and popular legitimacy, it produces policy 
that fails to comprehend the deeper dynam-
ics of a situation. In the case of the former 
Yugoslavia, for example, we unintentionally 
validated many of the radicals’ worst claims 
by supporting solutions – however reluc-
tantly – that separated neighbors – all of 
whom spoke the same language – for their 
own good. In this context, extremist nation-
alist politicians on all sides succeeded in 
creating radicalized and highly situational 
national communities by creatively using 
all of the standard media tools at their 
disposal. In doing so, these leaders did not 
actually reflect or even embody the ongo-
ing needs or desires of their national com-
munities, as they claimed. Instead, they 
pieced together several fearful elements of 
twentieth-century history at a time of social 
